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# ASEAN Defense Ministers' meeting-plus, Counter-terrorism exercise

Indonesian Peace and Security Center, Sentul, Indonesia

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# ASEAN DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING-PLUS COUNTER-TERRORISM EXERCISE

Indonesian Peace and Security Center • Sentul, Indonesia

09 - 13 SEP 2013



Securing Our People,  
Our Future Together



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## On The Cover:

(starting from top left, clockwise) 1. The Exercise Director, Army Special Forces Commander Major General Agus Sutomo, reports the status of the Counter-Terrorism Exercise (CTX) to General Moeldoko, Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander, and the U.S. co-chair, Ambassador David Carden, at the opening ceremony.  
2. MG Sutomo, the Exercise Director, briefs the TNI Commander, General Moeldoko, on the exercise facilities for the Practical Exercise (PE) and Full Mission Profile (FMP).  
3. & 4. Multinational teams practice boarding a mockup of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Tanker.  
5. Mr. Jim Petroni of CCMR and U.S. facilitator for Working Group One, shows participants how to weigh various threat factors in the Risk Assessment exercise.  
6. Exercise co-chairs Indonesian Minister of Defense Purnomo Yusgiantoro, and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Wechsler for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism.



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## ASEAN DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING-PLUS COUNTER-TERRORISM EXERCISE



**F**rom 9 to 13 September 2013, 872 personnel from the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) countries participated in a major Counter-Terrorism Exercise (CTX), in Sentul, Indonesia. The CTX was the first conducted under the auspices of the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group for Counter-Terrorism (EWG-CT), co-chaired by Indonesia and the United States (U.S.), and one of the five ADMM-Plus Expert Working Groups created at the first ADMM-Plus meeting of Defense Ministers in October 2010, in Hanoi, Vietnam.

In addition to the elaborate opening and closing ceremonies, this exercise consisted of three major elements:

### 1) Strategic-level table top exercise (TTX)

Senior civilian and military participants — and a smaller number of observers — from the ADMM-Plus countries attended presentations on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats, and conventional threats, which can produce CBRN-like effects. They were introduced to a methodology to assess and prioritize “all hazards” risks — natural and man-made — in Southeast Asia, and were briefed on Indonesia’s de-radicalization and re-integration efforts by Inspector General (Retired) Ansyad Mbai, the Director of the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Center, or BNPT.

During the remainder of the TTX, the participants were also presented with 2.5 credible terrorism scenarios, using a simulated “ASEAN” news broadcast, an intelligence summary and specific tasking, with the overarching question, “What can be done now by ADMM-Plus countries to better prepare for these types of events?”

All of the scenarios were specifically designed to require a multinational regional response. The first scenario was a maritime terrorism threat against a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility or tanker, either pier-side or transiting the region. The second scenario was a major regional sports and cultural event attended by dignitaries and celebrities from many countries. On the last day of the TTX, the threat of Man-Portable surface-to-air missiles, or MANPADS — in the hands of a sophisticated regional terrorism organization — was injected into the second scenario.

The TTX participants and observers were divided into four working groups, composed of four countries each, where they discussed the scenarios and came up with findings and recommendations, which were presented to all of the representatives in a plenary session at the end of each day.

### 2) Tactical-level practical exercise (PE)

Ten to 12 participants from 12 of the ADMM-Plus countries, along with observers, attended lectures and shared best practices on various anti-terrorism-related procedures in a “walk and talk” format. Participants were shown how to identify and counter various Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Australia and Singapore demonstrated how to assault a mock-up Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tanker and respond to a major hostage situation in a stadium. The PE activities were loosely tied to the TTX scenarios.

### 3) Full Mission Profile (FMP)

This was an elaborate tactical demonstration by various anti-terrorism units of Indonesian Special Operations Forces, as well as selected ADMM-Plus partners, prior to the closing ceremony. Originally planned as an Indonesian forces-only demonstration, the Indonesian hosts graciously added personnel from the other nations’ PE tactical teams to support parts of the demonstration.

The five-day CTX was the culmination of more than two years of planning by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and their National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT). On the U.S. side, representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC); Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCAPAC); and the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) were engaged in the planning since September 2011. Over those two years, the Indonesian and U.S. planners participated in multiple meetings in Makassar and Jakarta in Indonesia, and Washington, D.C., Honolulu, Hawaii, and Monterey, California, in the USA.

The CTX was a significant and tangible example of enhanced regional security cooperation by the 10 ASEAN and eight “Plus,” or ASEAN dialogue partner nations. Shortly before the CTX, the 18 ADMM-Plus Defense Ministers held their second meeting in Brunei on 29 August 2013.

In the CTX, senior participants from the various ADMM-Plus delegations identified many issues requiring enhanced regional coordination under the ASEAN organizational umbrella, and made specific recommendation on the way ahead. This report attempts to capture the planning, CTX highlights, and most importantly, issues and recommendations participants offered for future consideration by senior ADMM-Plus decision makers, especially the incoming co-chairs for the EWG-CT: Singapore and Australia. ■



## OVERVIEW

# ASEAN, ADMM, and ADMM-Plus

### Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The ADMM-Plus CTX illustrates impressive progress in ASEAN-related discussions and interaction on defense and security issues, demonstrating the objective of practical cooperation. To highlight the rapid advances made in recent years, the following is a brief overview of ASEAN, ADMM, ADMM-Plus and the Expert Working Group for Counter-Terrorism's planning, leading to the CTX in Sentul.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established in 1967, by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand signing the ASEAN Declaration. It was subsequently joined by Brunei Darussalam (1984), Vietnam (1995), Lao PDR and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999), to comprise the current 10 member states of ASEAN.

The aims of ASEAN include promoting economic growth and social progress; regional peace and stability; Southeast Asian studies; mutual assistance; collaboration in economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, agricultural, training and research areas; and cooperation with other similarly oriented international organizations. The organization's aims and purposes are more fully elaborated in the ASEAN Declaration.

The meeting recognized the positive contributions by the 'Plus' countries in enhancing peace, stability and development in Southeast Asia.



## The ADMM-Plus is the first official defense forum involving Defense Ministers of ASEAN Member States and key extra-regional dialogue partners.

To guide relations with one another, ASEAN Member States adopted principles of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity; freedom from external interference, subversion or coercion; non-interference in internal affairs; peaceful settlement of differences; renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia fully states ASEAN's fundamental principles.

### **ASEAN Member States:**

Brunei Darussalam  
Cambodia  
Lao PDR  
Indonesia  
Malaysia  
Myanmar  
Philippines  
Singapore  
Thailand  
Vietnam

## **ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)**

The ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), established in 2006, promotes dialogue and cooperation on defense and security matters in Southeast Asia.

As the highest defense mechanism within ASEAN, ADMM convenes annually to facilitate defense ministers' exchanging views on current defense and security challenges in the region. The ADMM aims to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of regional challenges and enhancement of transparency and openness.

Cooperative activities in the ASEAN defense sector have steadily increased since ADMM was established in 2006.

ASEAN Defense Ministers have adopted several concept papers regarding humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, engagement with civil society organizations and cooperation on non-traditional security issues. A significant number of concept papers also addressed linkages with extra-regional dialogue partners, which led to the development of ADMM-Plus.

### **ASEAN-plus 8:**

Australia  
China  
India  
Japan  
New Zealand  
Russia  
South Korea  
United States

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4





## ADMM-Plus

Following the ADMM principles of being open and outward looking, ADMM-Plus was conceived to extend regional security engagement and cooperation to ASEAN's key dialogue partners. A series of concept papers adopted at ADMMs from 2007 to 2010 culminated in the establishment of ADMM-Plus.

The inaugural ADMM-Plus was convened in Hanoi, Vietnam, on 12 October 2010. For the first time, the Defense Ministers from the 10 ASEAN member states gathered together with their counterparts from eight ASEAN Dialogue Partners, hereby referred to as the "Plus" countries: Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Russian Federation and the United States. These dialogue partners were incorporated into defense ministers' efforts to enhance Southeast Asia security, and to promote mutual trust and build capacity to address shared security challenges. The theme of the first ADMM-Plus meeting was "Strategic Cooperation for Peace, Stability and Development in the Region."

Vietnam hosted the first ADMM-Plus, which represented a significant milestone in ASEAN's history. The ADMM-Plus is the first official defense forum involving Defense Ministers of ASEAN Member States and key extra-regional countries. The ADMM-Plus is also the highest ministerial defense and security consultative and cooperative mechanism for regional security issues amongst the ASEAN members and the eight "Plus" countries.

The meeting recognized the positive contributions by the "Plus" countries in enhancing peace, stability and development in Southeast Asia. It also welcomed the interest of the "Plus" countries in promoting closer cooperation with ASEAN through the ADMM-Plus construct.

During the initial ADMM-Plus, the defense ministers agreed on five areas of practical cooperation to pursue under this new mechanism:

1. Maritime security
2. Counter-terrorism
3. Disaster management
4. Peacekeeping operations
5. Military medicine

Five Experts' Working Groups (EWGs) — each group comprising an ASEAN member and a "Plus" member as co-chairs — were established at the 28 April 2011 ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM) to facilitate cooperation on these areas. Tremendous progress was reflected in five EWGs being established and meeting within the first year of this new organization's existence.

The first ADMM-Plus further noted recent developments in implementing the ASEAN Charter and building an ASEAN Community by 2015 based on the three pillars of Political Security

Overall, the first meeting had a wide-ranging and fruitful exchange of views on regional and international security issues of mutual interest.



“We agreed to promote capacity building through greater engagement and interaction, enhance interoperability through training and joint exercises, and establish mechanisms for effective response”

– Chairman Mohammad Yasmin Bin Umar

Community, Economic Community and Social-Cultural Community. It also highlighted efforts by ASEAN in deepening the relationship with its Dialogue Partners under the framework of ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ADMM-Plus to support the goal of building the ASEAN Community.

Overall, the first meeting had a wide-ranging and fruitful exchange of views on regional and international security issues of mutual interest. It also shared updates on member countries' defense and security policies. The meeting reaffirmed that peace, stability and development remained the prevailing trends in the Asia-Pacific region. However, it noted the existence of complex and transnational security challenges that are beyond the scope of any country to handle alone, such as natural disaster, maritime security, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, climate change, transnational crime and infectious diseases.

Of note, only 10 days before the CTX in Sentul, the ADMM-Plus Defense Ministers held their second meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, on 29 August 2013. Under the chairmanship of Mohammad Yasmin Bin Umar, the 18 ASEAN and “Plus” defense ministers signed a joint declaration reaffirming their commitment to ASEAN, and their pact to work peacefully and cooperatively for a better future.

U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, who attended the second ADMM-Plus, said, “I see this second ministerial of the ADMM-Plus as a landmark event.” Hagel elaborated, “In 2010, when then-Secretary [Robert M.] Gates joined you, our countries committed to making the ADMM-Plus action-oriented. Under ASEAN leadership, we are well on our way, with three multinational field exercises this year — a major accomplishment. I am proud that the United States has been a partner and participant all along the way.”

After the signing of the Bandar Seri Begawan Joint Declaration,

Chairman Yasmin discussed key outcomes and said the group was pleased with its substantial achievement this year, especially the five ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Groups that have forged political cooperation among defense forces.

Chairman Yasmin added that the group recommitted to strengthen defense cooperation in promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, based on the enduring principle of equality, mutual respect, mutual benefit and respect for international law.

“In doing so, we agreed to promote capacity building through greater engagement and interaction, enhance interoperability through training and joint exercises, and establish mechanisms for effective response,” Yasmin stated.


Hagel wrapped up by saying the ADMM-Plus is setting the right example, with coordinated approaches to transnational and nontraditional threats.

“Working together develops regional capacity and the habits of cooperation we need to solve today's complex problems,” he declared. “Exercising together builds trust and understanding, and reduces the risk of conflict when disputes arise.”

At the end of the second ADMM-Plus, Yasmin noted the group extensively discussed international and regional security and defense issues, and plans to meet again in Malaysia in 2015.

The Defense Ministers agreed on 29 May 2012 at the sixth ADMM to increase the ADMM-Plus frequency from every three years to every two years. This increase in frequency is an encouraging sign of progress in cooperation. Another marker of the young organization's increasing pace and scope of cooperation is the creation on 7 May 2013 at the seventh ADMM of a sixth EWG on humanitarian mine action, to be co-chaired by Vietnam and India. ■





**More people live inside ADMM-Plus countries  
than the rest of the world combined.  
In addition, more than half of the world's GDP  
resides in these 18 ADMM-Plus countries.**

### POPULATION

#### ASEAN Member States:

Brunei Darussalam	412,238
Cambodia	14,864,646
Indonesia	246,864,191
Lao PDR	6,645,827
Malaysia	29,239,927
Myanmar	52,797,319
Philippines	96,706,764
Singapore	5,312,400
Thailand	66,785,001
Vietnam	88,775,500
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>608,403,813</b>

#### ASEAN-plus 8:

Australia	22,683,600
China	1,350,695,000
India	1,236,686,732
Japan	127,561,489
New Zealand	4,433,100
Russia	143,533,000
South Korea	50,004,000
United States	313,914,040
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>3,249,510,961</b>

**Total** **3,857,914,774**

**Rest of the World**  
**3,188,454,039**

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

### GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) Millions of \$US

#### ASEAN Member States:

Brunei Darussalam	\$16,954
Cambodia	\$14,062
Indonesia	\$878,043
Lao PDR	\$9,299
Malaysia	\$303,526
Myanmar	\$55,320
Philippines	\$250,265
Singapore	\$274,701
Thailand	\$365,564
Vietnam	\$141,669
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>\$2,309,403</b>

#### ASEAN-plus 8:

Australia	\$1,520,608
China	\$8,227,103
India	\$1,841,717
Japan	\$5,959,718
New Zealand	\$139,768
Russia	\$2,022,000
South Korea	\$1,129,598
United States	\$15,684,800
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>\$36,525,312</b>

**Total** **\$38,834,715**

**Rest of the World**  
**\$32,831,635**

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_GDP\\_%28nominal%29#cite\\_note-6](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29#cite_note-6)  
"GDP (current US\$)". World Bank. Retrieved December 18, 2013.



“Working together develops regional capacity and the habits of cooperation we need to solve today’s complex problems. Exercising together builds trust and understanding, and reduces the risk of conflict when disputes arise.”

– U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel

The Road to Sentul:

# THE EXPERT WORKING GROUP FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM





(above) The First meeting of the Expert Working Group for Counter-Terrorism in Makassar, Indonesia, 19-20 September 2011.

**The road to the first ADMM-Plus CTX in Sentul, Indonesia, begins with the first meeting of the Expert Working Group for Counter-Terrorism (EWG-CT) in Makassar, Indonesia, from 19-20 September 2011. This first meeting was co-chaired by Major General Syaiful Anwar, Vice Rector of Indonesian Defense University, and Mr. Garry Reid, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism.**

This inaugural meeting of the EWG-CT was attended by most of the ADMM-Plus countries: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam.

The main objective of this meeting was to lay a solid framework in determining the course of practical cooperation in counter-terrorism. Among the agenda put forward in this first meeting were discussions on the definition of counter-terrorism, roles of defense in counter-terrorism, challenges in developing counter-terrorism capabilities, as well as types and scopes of possible exercises.

In February 2012, the Indonesian and U.S. co-chairs of the EWG-CT held a Concept Development Workshop in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. The co-chairs agreed on the three scenarios and two topics for presentation, as well as the general design of the exercise to have a strategic-level Table Top Exercise, along with a simultaneous operational- to tactical-level Practical Exercise, or PE.

In April 2012, at the second meeting of the EWG-CT and Initial Planning Conference for the CTX in Washington, D.C., representatives

from 16 of the 18 ADMM-Plus countries were briefed on the proposed concept and scenarios. All delegations agreed to the scenarios and presentations. One delegation warned that having three separate scenarios might be too ambitious for a weeklong exercise. As a result, Scenario 3 — the MANPADS threat — was modified to be a major inject for Scenario 2, the major regional sports and cultural event.

In March of 2013, the ADMM-Plus EWG-CT held its third meeting and Final Planning Conference for the CTX in Jakarta. ADMM-Plus EWG-CT delegations toured the proposed site for the CTX — the Indonesian Peace and Security Centre in Sentul, West Java.

In August, the representatives held the Final Site Survey and discussed the detailed agenda of the exercise.

The Expert Working Group for Counter-Terrorism (EWG-CT), co-chaired by Indonesia and the United States since 2011, has worked to enhance the coordination and coherence of regional counter-terrorism (CT) efforts with all ADMM-Plus countries. To date, the EWG-CT process has helped identify new opportunities, as well as potential challenges, in achieving these goals. ■




# SENTUL:

## The First CTX of ADMM-Plus EWG-CT

**T**he first ADMM-Plus Counter-Terrorism Exercise (CTX) was held at the Indonesian Peace and Security Center (IPSC) in Sentul, West Java, Indonesia, from 9 to 13 September 2013. The CTX was a major multinational exercise, and an important stepping-stone toward enhanced CT cooperation and effectiveness for ADMM-Plus nations.

The EWG-CT co-chairmanship of Indonesia and the U.S. will transfer to Singapore and Australia in April 2014. ■

# CTX 2011 – 2013 Timeline







## >> ADMM-Plus Counter-Terrorism Exercise Opening Ceremony

Lieutenant Colonel Wong, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Dicky, Indonesian Armed Forces, report to General Moeldoko, Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Counter-Terrorism Exercise (CTX) Inspector, and U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN, David Carden, for the CTX opening ceremony's ceremonial badging.



General Moeldoko addresses the CTX participants from the 18 ADMM-Plus countries on the changing threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia.

# OPENING CEREMONY

**T**he Opening Ceremony of the ADMM-Plus Counter-Terrorism Exercise (ADMM-Plus CTX) commenced with a ceremonial badging before a great media presence. Prior to the ceremony, the meeting of representatives from all ADMM-Plus countries allowed an opportunity for informal dialogue and network building between services, countries, agencies and affiliations — both officers and civilians.

The regional CTX involved 872 military and civilian personnel from all 18 countries. Indonesia had the largest number of participants and facilitators, with a total of 405 personnel, followed by the U.S., with 36 personnel primarily from the United States Special Operations Command, Pacific (USSOCPAC) and other U.S. Hawaii-based units. Most ADMM-Plus nations sent the requested four participants for the TTX, and 10-12 Practical Exercise participants.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 14



# “The long-term goal of the exercise was to have a common regional procedure in tackling transnational terrorism.”

– General Moeldoko

The opening address by both the Indonesian and United States’ co-chairs highlighted the exercise’s historic significance. Indonesia’s Military Commander of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (or Indonesia’s Armed Forces), General Moeldoko, described the objectives of the ADMM-Plus CTX, which go far beyond the goal of mutual cooperation, but also working together to develop technologies.

Moeldoko also explained in his opening remarks that terrorist groups have migrated from a traditional pattern to a modern pattern called the “phantom cell network.” He said that the groups intentionally scatter themselves to make it difficult to identify them, but they basically share a similar ideology. Moeldoko added that the long-term goal of the exercise was to have a common regional procedure in tackling transnational terrorism.

“This very first meeting, however, is not to achieve that yet,” he declared. “But this will open a way for discussion on how to tackle terrorism among participating countries.”

From the U.S. side, U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN David L. Carden, discussed the issue of regional, nontraditional security threats. He invited regional military participants to expand cooperation, build capabilities and share the lessons learned from the CTX, as well as to be mindful of other issues, such as food security and protection of fisheries.

Carden further expressed hope that the event would be a very good way to share best practices and information among participating countries, in order to cooperate better and address the problems in the region, including terrorism.

“We are all on the same team,” he emphasized. “It doesn’t matter what uniform we are wearing; it doesn’t matter whether we are even wearing a uniform; we are faced with food security, water security and counter-terrorism issues.” ■



Malaysian CTX participants listen to General Moeldoko and Ambassador Carden at the opening ceremony.



Participants from the Australia, Brunei Darussalam, China and Indonesian delegations listen to General Moeldoko’s remarks at the opening ceremony.





Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces General Moeldoko and U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN David Carden appear with the senior representatives from the various ADMM-Plus delegations to the CTX, and senior Indonesian officers.



U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN David Carden addresses the ADMM-Plus exercise participants.



Ambassador Carden and General Moeldoko speaking to the media after the opening ceremony.

# TTX

## Table Top Exercise

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**The Table Top Exercise (TTX) was a weeklong series of facilitated, multinational small group discussions of issues related to hypothetical terrorism threats, and involved approximately 70 participants and observers from 17 of the 18 ADMM-Plus countries. It was not a test or evaluation of any nation's plans or capabilities to deal with these threats. Rather, the combined results of these discussions provided input for future ADMM-Plus projects or proposals in pursuit of the stated objectives.**

The facilitated TTX highlighted the complexities from strategic decision-making to tactical execution, and demonstrated the gaps created in “authorities and approvals” when a mission is passed from the strategic to the tactical decision-making level.

Day 1 included a TTX overview and a presentation on Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, and various conventional and industrial chemical hazards that could produce CBRN-like effects. As CBRN weapons have the capacity to cause large numbers of casualties, they are considered “weapons of mass destruction,” with the potential for major societal impact even in relatively small incidents.

Participants gained an appreciation for the qualitative differences between conventional terrorist attacks and attacks involving CBRN weapons. They acquired general knowledge of the different types of CBRN weapons and where specialized technical information can be accessed. They also understood the importance of having knowledge of their country's capabilities and, if needed, what special regional capabilities may be available to them. As reference for a later scenario, participants were also informed of chemical energy weapons, which consist of gasoline, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG).

# TTX

## All-Hazards Risk Assessment

In the afternoon, the TTX participants were introduced to a methodology to score “all hazards” (man-made and natural) threats to Southeast Asia, using the weighting criteria of:

### History

- This is based on the premise that if it happened before, it will happen again, thus a longer history provides a better perspective.
- The raw score for this criterion is multiplied by 2.

### Vulnerability

- This is the estimation of how susceptible your country or region is to a particular threat.
- Factors to consider include human factors (psychological, social, political, etc.) and physical factors.
- The raw score for this criterion is multiplied by 5.

### Maximum threat

- This would be the most realistic, worst-case potential, both in terms of physical effects and human factors.
- This is the most significant of all criteria in determining relative risk.
- The raw score for this criterion is multiplied by 10.

### Probability

- This is the likelihood of occurrence of a major event of this type (only major event probabilities considered).
- The raw score for this criterion is multiplied by 7.



Colone! Tay Hui Hian, Singaporean Armed Forces, leads Working Group 3 in discussion of “All-Hazards” Risk Assessment.



Mr. Rob Gandy from the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), U.S. facilitator for Working Group 2, explains the process for ranking “all hazard” threats in the Risk Assessment exercise.



# Working Groups

After the Risk Assessment presentation, the TTX participants and observers were then divided into four working groups, each comprised of four countries. Each working group had facilitators from Indonesia and the United States, as well as a rapporteur, to capture the key discussion points and to assist in preparation of briefings. Participants were instructed that there would be a “non-attribution” policy by individual and nation, meaning that comments in the working groups would not be attributed to specific individuals or even nations. This encouraged greater freedom of discussion.

Working Group 1 consisted of Indonesia, Russia, Korea and the Philippines, as well as Laos as an observer.

Working Group 2 included the United States, India, Vietnam and Thailand.

Working Group 3 comprised Singapore, Brunei, China and Cambodia.

Working Group 4 consisted of Australia, Japan, Malaysia and Myanmar.

When the working groups first met in their separate classrooms in the IPSC, each group was instructed to choose a Group Leader from among the participants to guide the discussions and brief the plenary gathering on the group's findings at the end of the day. The selected Group Leader kept the discussions focused on the topic and questions, and encouraged participation from all the group members.

Due to time limitations, each group was asked to identify and score up to eight major regional threats, including terrorism, and compare them to each other using the methodology provided. The exercise led to some interesting discussions and surprising outcomes in the four working groups. For example, all four groups scored the threat of terrorism relatively low compared to natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, flooding, epidemics, etc. This is perhaps reflective of the geographical region, as the Asia-Pacific experiences more than half of the world's major natural disasters. The detailed findings and scorings from all the groups are listed below.

Group 1 ranked natural calamities first, epidemics second, terrorism by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) third, cyber crimes and transnational crimes equally ranked at fourth, terrorism was fifth, piracy sixth and maritime traffic accidents seventh.

Group 2 ranked the top hazard as natural disasters; crimes as second; manmade disasters, radicalization and pandemics all equal as third; and terrorism as fourth.

Group 3 ranked earthquakes first, epidemics second, floods third, transnational crime fourth and terrorism fifth.

Group 4 ranked forced migration, inclusive of human trafficking, as the top hazard, followed by terrorism, earthquakes third, epidemics fourth, narcotics fifth and cyclones sixth.



Australian Colonel Craig Shortt, leading TTX Group 4 discussions on the responses to the second scenario.



Working Group 4 (Australia, Japan, Malaysia and Myanmar) at top; Working Group 1 (Indonesia, Russia, the Philippines, Republic of Korea and Laos) Bottom Left; and Working Group 3 (Singapore, China, Brunei and Cambodia) at bottom right, discuss "All-Hazards Risk Assessment" and where the threat of terrorism ranks compared to other natural and man-made threats to the ASEAN region.



# TTX

## The Two and A Half Threat Scenarios

On the second, third and fourth days of the TTX, the same four working groups were then presented with two and a half regional terrorism scenarios in plenary sessions. The scenarios were specifically designed to require a multinational response. Each scenario was introduced with a simulated “ASEAN” news broadcast, an intelligence summary and specific tasking. The working groups were asked to come up with regional responses to the threats in each scenario, using the ADMM-Plus construct, if possible.

The purpose of the discussion was not to necessarily answer each of the questions; instead, the discussion focused on the

strengths and weaknesses of the regional capabilities and coordination. The working groups prepared briefings for the plenary group on the findings of their discussions, with the main question posed: “What can be done now by ADMM-Plus countries to better prepare for these kinds of events?”

After the participants in the four working groups discussed the scenarios, they debriefed a plenary session at the end of each day on their recommendations regarding how their respective countries and ASEAN should respond to the scenarios.



(Left to right) Mrs. Curie Maharani; RADM (ret.) Wells standing in back; Mr. Lam Pros, Chief of Bureau SNCTC Cambodia; LTC Depak Kumar Shorey, Singapore; LTC C K Pang, Singapore; and Mr. Zachary Ang Han Wei, Singapore.





## Scenario #1

On the second day of the TTX, participants were presented with Scenario 1, which described indications of an imminent maritime terrorist attack against a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility or tanker in Southeast Asia. Credible intelligence stated that the Global Anarchist Union (GAU), an issue-motivated group (IMG), was planning attacks in Southeast Asia against a LNG facility or tanker either transiting the shipping lanes or pier-side. The intelligence indicated that senior GAU leadership ordered its cells in Southeast Asia to prepare for the attacks, which would occur at the earliest opportunity. The attacks were intended to disrupt regional energy trade and seriously damage Asian economies.

While little was known about their true motivations and ideology, GAU terrorists have sought Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), or weapons and tactics that would provide casualties and psychological impact similar to a WMD attack.

Group 1's response to this scenario concluded that in order for ADMM-Plus countries to be better prepared to respond to the threat of maritime terrorism, there needs to be mechanisms for intelligence sharing and fusion, enhanced interagency and multinational cooperation, and education and training.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 22

Group 1 suggested improving existing regional mechanisms on information sharing and response, involving the civilian sector regarding maritime terrorism and building common security awareness at the ADMM-Plus level. The group also recommended evaluating existing laws in the region, enhancing prevention efforts, coordinating better between the EWGs for maritime security and counter-terrorism, and evaluating regional capability to deal with the maritime threat and the consequences of a successful attack.

Group 2's comments regarding Scenario 1 began with the expectation to hear of the threat through governmental channels (e.g. Coast Guards, Naval patrols, etc.); informal channels, such as seafaring communities and cruise liners; shipping companies; and the perpetrators themselves. The group's immediate concerns included public panic, fear in the LNG industry, economic disruptions and adverse remarks/propaganda by surrounding countries.

Group 2's immediate actions were to gather intelligence at the earliest indication of a threat, verify intelligence reports as more information is gathered, assess resulting intelligence for credibility and establish a multinational, regional crisis management center. Other actions included begin designing a strategic communications plan for messaging and information dissemination, conduct robust information sharing across nations, alert the appropriate units of action — both civil and military — throughout the region, and share information across the LNG establishment and include them in actions.

Group 2 also had recommendations for strategic and operational coordination. At the strategic level, the group requested personnel inform neighboring countries through diplomatic channels, neighboring countries establish a joint committee or temporary mechanism, neighboring countries coordinate to reduce potential environmental, economic and other cascading effects, and surrounding countries exhibit a consistent reaction. At the operational level, personnel should request that neighboring countries be prepared to provide assistance, and coordinate and monitor LNG vessels, if feasible.

Group 3, in response to the LNG tanker scenario, expected to have information sharing through regional cooperation, and verification before passing information along to others. The information should come from multiple sources, in order to get different perspectives, and then share the information with multiple agencies within the countries. The concerns and implications for the country and region included verifying intelligence to find out more about the terrorist group, and potential target and impact, adequate capabilities to respond to the attack/threat, mobilizing forces within the country, understanding legality of ship owner and operation in territorial waters, and media, with regards to the balance of informing the public and avoiding panic.

Group 3's immediate actions were to look at the intention, capabilities and opportunities to narrow down the possibility of the threat, alert the industry to strengthen security measures at facilities and on board their ships, and track the LNG traffic to observe any abnormality. Group members also stated that they would take stock of regional response forces and their whereabouts, assess the impact and plan for the cordon around an incident, and alert possible units for consequence management response.

In regards to critical decisions, Group 3 members pointed out that every country has its own crisis management framework. For

examples, Brunei has its National Security Council; Cambodia has its National Counter Terrorism Committee, China has its National Counter Terrorism Leading Group, and Singapore has its Homeland Crisis Executive Group.

Group 3's aim was to make sure the media strategy at the national, bilateral and multilateral levels can have alignment. The group members emphasized common concerns, interests and vulnerabilities. They discussed how to balance informing the public while reducing the possibility of a panic, and how to compete with terrorist groups in communicating to the public through social media.

Group 4's comments in response to the LNG threat scenario included that a mechanism should be established in each country from the strategic to tactical level, decision-making rests with house representatives, ministries and government leaders, and an information exchange mechanism is important. The group also noted that action and coordination are required from each country, security architecture is important and a regional center for coordination of CT-related information may be required.

The group pointed out that the current strengths are national crisis response arrangements, and existing mechanisms at the strategic and operational levels. The weaknesses include identifying appropriate contact persons for information exchange when a crisis requires multinational coordination, understanding what the "trigger" for activation is of these crisis action groups at the country level, and capacity of intelligence agencies to deal with threats across the spectrum, and share accurate information in a timely manner.

For prevention, Group 4 recommended enhancing information and intelligence exchange, combining activity between maritime security and CT EWGs, creating a baseline CT initiative or working group, and gaining the interest of the community (national support). Group members also suggested engaging with private sector industries to increase awareness, studying the mindset of terrorists, and establishing or expanding an existing joint operation center to patrol LNG facilities and routes.

The participants wanted to learn more about Singapore's existing Information Fusion Centre, which tracks regional shipping and already has liaison officers from some ADMM-Plus countries.

“...conduct robust information sharing across nations; alert the appropriate units of action, both civil and military, throughout the region...”

– Group 2

“Make sure  
that the world  
never forgets these games.”

– Senior GAU Leader,  
Scenario 2



## **Scenario #2**

On the third day of the TTX, participants were presented with Scenario 2, a threat against a major regional event, the “All Asia Sports and Cultural Festival.” Stadiums and other venues for the event presented lucrative targets, with extensive media coverage already built in for the terrorists to exploit. Therefore, authorities faced a dilemma between their need to protect personnel, and, at the same time, allowing freedom of movement for dignitaries, athletes, performers and spectators to attend events.

There was credible intelligence that the GAU was planning attacks during the “All Asia Sports and Cultural Festival.” Senior GAU leadership ordered its cells to start planning for the attacks 18 months ago. There were few details on the nature and timing of the planned attack, but in intercepted communications, a senior GAU leader said, “Make sure that the world never forgets these games.”

In the pre-incident phase of Scenario 2, Group 2 stressed the need for national and regional threat assessments, understanding regional assets and capabilities, and development of the right organization as a means for coordination. The group also emphasized information sharing and international cooperation, emergency responses and inter-agency coordination, and communication/media management.

During the incident phase, Group 2 members recommended verifying the type of threat, organizing a Crisis Management Center, with communication at all levels, responding in accordance to the rule of law, responding to medical emergencies to save lives and mitigate the danger to public safety, and communicating and managing the media.

For the post-incident phase, group members suggested enhanced consequence management preparation, gaining specific intelligence on the perpetrators prior to the event, and communications/media management. Group 2 also recommended maintenance of economic and social confidence, follow-on response for punitive actions and proper disposition of captured personnel/terrorists, and the identification of lessons learned — shortcomings and required

capacity to build needed programs.

In its response to Scenario 2, Group 3’s concerns and implications for the country and neighboring countries were the safety of citizens, especially dignitaries and other very important persons (VIPs). Evacuation plans and procedures need to be in place, and VIPs need to adjust security depending on intelligence from respective countries. Intelligence and verification, as well as control of exit and entry points (national borders), and coordination with neighboring countries for preventive measures are crucial. Other concerns were security at all venues, isolation versus shutdown — isolating other ongoing events or closing down an expensive event, management of media to avoid public panic, and the legal frameworks binding key institutions, such as homeland security stakeholders, and other militaries and institutions’ support.

The immediate actions of Group 3 included the criteria for the evacuation of VIPs and citizens, verification of intelligence leads, and control of exit and entry at borders, including establishment of coordination with neighboring countries. Other actions were security of the area, the decision of isolation or shutdown, media control to avoid public panic, intelligence sharing, and identification of the terrorist group and its possible location.

Group 3’s critical decisions would be made by the in-country coordinating mechanism, which would manage both intelligence and operations. Group members felt it was important to increase capacities of CT training and resources allocation, using risk assessment and contingency planning. They also mentioned issues in dealing with resource constraints, like manpower versus technology and financial decisions, and the legal framework, such as existing frameworks for cooperation.

*Groups 1 and 4 identified similar issues but reserved their analysis of Scenario 2, in order to consider Scenarios 2 and 2.5 together as a continuous story.*





## Scenario #2.5

On the fourth day of the TTX, participants were introduced to Scenario 2.5, which was purposely numbered to indicate a follow-on situation developed from details in Scenario 2. Scenario 2.5 involved a threat of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) discovered in a GAU safe house. Police raids on suspected terrorist safe houses uncovered five well-maintained MANPADS in one location, in addition to documents and computer forensic evidence indicating that they were part of a larger shipment brought into the region/country through a sophisticated arms smuggling operation.

Passport stamps and visas of the detained individuals indicated that they had traveled to six other regional countries over the past year. Documents, photographs, videos and line drawings of more than 20 major airports and their surrounding areas in those six countries, were also discovered. Preliminary analysis indicated that their planning was in its final stages.

After Group 1's discussions of Scenarios 2 and 2.5, the members decided that there must be intelligence fusion, and education and training, as well as the expansion of cooperation mechanisms beyond ADMM-Plus. They suggested enhancing existing mechanisms, such as the ASEAN analysts exchange program, annual ASEAN Intelligence Conference, and cross-border monitoring and control activities. Group 1 members also advised legislative effort for anti- and counter-terrorism measures to address regional concerns; and prevention, preparedness and response protocols on joint/combined efforts. They further noted the importance of strategic communication and common intelligence training and education.

In their assessment of Scenarios 2 and 2.5, Group 4 members commented on national boundaries, and the importance of strategic communication with the public, demonstration of intent, prioritization of effort and agreement with partners. Their immediate concerns regarding the major sporting and cultural event were safety of life and property, and coordination of national efforts with regional needs.

Regarding MANPADS, Group 4 agreed to take the following actions: verify information from security personnel, alert the air traffic control authorities for safety of aircraft and passengers, alert and provide travel advice to the public, and share key information only with the appropriate authorities. Group members also suggested to tighten airport security, cordon the possible MANPADS launch areas around airports, request extra manpower, and seek all possible support/assistance and international coordination.

The group's immediate actions for response to the MANPADS

threat were to increase coordination among intelligence agencies, collect information on MANPADS being smuggled into the country, review and execute a strategic communication plan, utilize existing mechanism in ASEAN Secretariat for center coordination purposes, and prepare a contingency plan for countering misinformation in the public domain.

With regard to MANPADS, Group 2 recommended analysis of the terrain, and determination of any threat employment and vulnerabilities, analysis and exploitation of existing intelligence, information and intelligence sharing, public awareness campaign, and key decisions to continue, modify or cancel the event, if necessary.

Group 2's implications for this scenario were mutual understanding and shared interests, understanding of each other's complementary capabilities, the building of trust to cooperate, and mechanisms to share and cooperate.

Group 3 said the issues with MANPADS include counter-proliferation, public awareness, intelligence analysis of the terrorists' past visits to six countries and 20 airports, information about terrorist group, case studies and modus operandi, and better filtration of intelligence and assignment of priorities.

The group members stressed the importance of stopping weapons proliferation and countering transnational crime, stopping free movement of terrorists across borders, denying the availability of launch sites, and managing consequences, such as economic impact of airport closures, diversion of air traffic, readiness of relevant agencies and regional assistance.

“...there must be  
intelligence fusion, and  
education and training, as well  
as the expansion of  
cooperation mechanisms  
beyond ADMM-Plus.”

– TTX Participant

The two and a half TTX scenarios uncovered the following common threads in all four working groups:

- Build common security awareness at the ADMM-Plus level
- Evaluate existing laws in the region
- Respond in accordance with the rule of law
- Enhance prevention efforts
- Improve existing regional mechanisms on information sharing and response
- Design a strategic communications plan and process for messaging and information dissemination, as well as to demonstrate solidarity among partner nations
- Evaluate regional capabilities and capacity
- Look for closer coordination opportunities between applicable EWGs
- Discuss consequence management
- Establish a multinational/regional Crisis Management Center; or expand the charter and mission of an existing center, such as the ASEAN HA/DR Crisis Center, to include prevention and response to man-made disasters, such as terrorism
- Build sufficient trust to coordinate using multinational Special Operations Forces and CT education, as a recommended initial approach
- Mechanisms to share and collaborate “best practices” and “lessons learned”

Overall, the purpose of the TTX was to promote and enhance cooperation between Defense and Armed Forces within the framework of ADMM-Plus. Participants learned to enhance their situational awareness, with a shared understanding of common challenges, leverage defense competencies and capabilities among members, exchange perspectives on the international terrorist

threat and related nontraditional security threats, and strengthen the regional capability on countering a terrorist threat.

All of the groups recommended expanded participation in future EWG-CT exercises, to include law enforcement officials, diplomats and intelligence professionals involved in counter-terrorism issues. ■



TTX participants and observers from the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Singapore, India, the U.S. and Myanmar discuss various terrorism threats to ASEAN nations, and how an ADMM Plus regional response can alleviate those threats.

# COUNTERING TERRORISM: AN INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE



Colonel Werijon of the BNPT [left] introduces Inspector General (ret.) Anysaad Mbai [right], Director of the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT).

**O**n the third day of the CTX, Inspector General (ret.) Anysaad Mbai, the Director of the BNPT, gave a presentation to the TTX participants titled, “Countering Terrorism: An Indonesian Perspective.”

Director Mbai first provided some background information on Indonesia's history of terrorism dating back to the post-independence era in the late 1940s. He warned that from the 1950s through 1980s, the Indonesian government used extensive military force and implemented draconian laws, such as the Anti-Subversion Law, to capture and kill terrorists, but while they succeeded in suppressing terrorism, the results were short-lived at best. According to Director Mbai, the most important lesson learned from that multi-decade experience was that, “the more physical pressure brought to bear upon them (terrorists), the more militant and radical they become.”

As a result, in 1998, during a period called “Reformasi,” the Government of Indonesia had become fully committed to the process of democratization and the protection of fundamental human rights, and abrogated the Anti-Subversion Law.

Over the years, this commitment has brought about changes in the policy and strategy for dealing with terrorism, which include recognition of democratic values, such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. In turn, this has resulted in a quandary for the government, particularly the security and intelligence services, in controlling and monitoring activities by militant groups, and has made it difficult to be proactive in preventing terrorist attacks.

Since 2002, Indonesia has experienced five major attacks: first Bali bombings in 2002; JW. Marriott Hotel bombing in 2003; Australian Embassy bombing in 2004; second Bali bombings in 2005; and

simultaneous bombings at the JW Marriott Hotel and Ritz-Carlton Hotel in 2009. All these terrorist atrocities killed hundreds of people and injured many.

A string of investigations and court proceedings has proved that many of the terrorist attacks bear the mark of al Jamaah al Islamiyah (JI). Around 900 suspects have been arrested; 600 have been sent to court; and the rest are in the process of being brought to justice.

Today, Indonesia is facing a trend of radicalization that involves a broad spectrum of society. There is an urgent need to tandem Indonesia's hard approach through law enforcement, with a softer approach through persuasive programs under de-radicalization, disengagement and counter-radicalization.

According to existing Indonesian legislation, when a situation is beyond police capacity, the Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, or POLRI) may ask for the assistance of the military. The engagement of the military should be based on a political decision. For this purpose, the government established the National Counterterrorism Agency, or BNPT, in July 2010. From then, the military may be called upon to deploy in support of the police and under the operational control of the BNPT. When there is a terror crisis, the BNPT will function as the “terrorist crisis center” that assists the President in formulating policy and taking the necessary operational steps to handle the situation.

The BNPT is mandated to formulate policies, strategies and national programs in counter-terrorism; assist related government agencies in implementing counter-terrorism policies; and implement counter-terrorism policies on the ground by establishing task forces (satuan tugas/satgas) composed of related government agencies that are responsible for both “hard” and “soft” approaches.



“The more physical pressure brought to bear upon them (terrorists), the more militant and radical they become.”

– Director Ansyaad Mbai

The BNPT — in partnership with elements of civil society, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and religious organizations — has launched a de-radicalization program aimed at de-radicalizing extremists, ideologists and terrorists. It has also created a counter-radicalization program, aiming to increase public awareness of the danger of radicalism and extremism. At the same time, the BNPT is encouraging and empowering communities and civil societies to build resilience, and have the confidence to challenge radical and extreme propaganda.

Because radical terrorists have infiltrated and influenced places of worship, schools and prison through media campaign and propaganda, Director Mbai stressed the need to set up comprehensive, preventive and countering efforts to prevent those critical points of interest from being influenced by terrorists and radicals’ agenda.

As the complex and changing nature of terrorist networks requires Indonesia to continually reassess and renew measures traditionally used, Director Mbai stated that a creative and nonconventional strategy is essential to deal with new crimes.

A two-pronged strategy would focus on two aspects of counter-terrorism: a robust law enforcement approach, with the support of the Indonesian Defence Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia [TNI]), because terrorists are using guerilla tactics; and a program of de-radicalization and counter-radicalization to counter radical ideology, as well as increase awareness and preparedness.

According to Director Mbai, Indonesia is conducting specific programs that target prisons, places of worship, schools and media. Initiatives and activities — ranging from collaboration with former terrorists; re-education and rehabilitation of ex-convicts and their families; empowerment of religious education institutions; enhancement of awareness in schools; to engagement with media to generate counter-narratives against radicals and terrorists — have already been completed.

The BNPT has also established a Terror Prevention Coordination Forum that consists of elements from government institutions, academicians and civil society in 20 provinces. The forum has been training trainers, disseminating information to schools, and organizing reintegration programs for ex-convicts and their families.

In addition, Indonesia is constructing a De-radicalization Center in Sentul, near the Indonesian Peace and Security Center site. The De-radicalization Center plans to host a training ground and a knowledge-based center for de-radicalization issues. ■

## INDONESIAN NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM AGENCY

# BNPT

## Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme

The interdepartmental Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency, or Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), was established on 16 July 2010, with Presidential Decree Number 46. Staffed by representatives from various ministries with counter-terrorism responsibilities, BNPT is tasked to:


- Formulate policies, strategies and programs in the field of counter-terrorism
- Coordinate government agencies in implementing and carrying out policies in the field of counter-terrorism
- Implement policies in the field of counter-terrorism by establishing interagency task forces, with elements from the relevant government agencies, in accordance with the duties, functions and authority of each
- Field of counter-terrorism covering prevention, protection, de-radicalization, prosecution and preparation of national preparedness

BNPT will recommend to the President when military capabilities should be used to augment and support the National Police's counter-terrorism squad, Special Detachment 88, although the police retain the leading role in counter-terrorism activities under this agency.

The new agency replaced the Anti-Terrorism Coordinating Desk, which was housed in the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs. Inspector General (retired) Ansyaad Mbai, who was sworn in on 7 September 2010 as chief of the agency, said the BNPT has a wide range of authorities in the prevention and eradication of terrorism, and stated, “To make it effective, we need close cooperation with other institutions, such as the military, the Religious Affairs Ministry, academics and other related parties.”

While the head of BNPT reports directly to the President, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs retains oversight of the agency. ■

The event provided the opportunity for all participating teams to meet, socialize, and start building professional relationships and enduring friendship.



A U.S. facilitator demonstrates triggering devices for various Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) during the Practical Exercise (PE) portion of the CTX.

# PE THE PRACTICAL EXERCISE





A U.S. PE facilitator discusses PE evolution with MG Sutomo (Exercise Director) [center] and Brig. Gen. Jan Peter Ate [left].



TTX Participants from Japan, the Philippines, Singapore and China observe the PE event.

## **H**eld concurrently with the TTX, the Practical Exercise welcomed up to 10-12 tactical-level participants or observers from the ADMM-Plus nations.

The PE began with two days of ice breaker events that included a marksmanship challenge, an obstacle course run and other sports events. The team composition for all ice breaker events was a mixture of 10 individuals from different nations. The event provided the opportunity for all participating teams to meet, socialize, and start building professional relationships and enduring friendship.

During the CTX, the PE participants attended classroom lectures and field activities, where they were introduced to common improvised explosive device (IED) threats, and shared best practices on various anti-terrorism-related procedures.

The PE was loosely linked to the TTX scenarios in a counter-terrorism operating environment in support of civil authorities, and culminated in a rehearsal of concept (ROC) “walk and talk” drill based on the TTX scenarios.

Twelve ADMM-Plus countries contributed to the PE portion of the CTX: Australia, Brunei, China, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam.

The U.S. Army Pacific’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Center provided a two-day intelligence brief and baseline familiarization on C-IED awareness and lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was followed by hands-on familiarization of stationary and patrolling lanes, and Home-Made Explosives (HME) awareness.



## The Practical Exercise

A TNI PE participant climbs the boarding ladder to the mock LNG tanker.

Many of the countries were interested in receiving follow-up training on C-IED and were discussing among themselves how to do follow-up C-IED training with each other.

On the following two days, the PE Groups received a mission brief and began planning at team level. Each team member in the group presented his or her country's Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), and Courses of Action (COA) as to how they would handle the scenario. Later, teams collectively came together and developed a group plan based off of each country's TTPs.

In the afternoon, a crawl, walk and talk session was conducted for each scenario. Upon completion of the scenarios, each area conducted a group After Action Report (AAR). On the third day, the TTX participants observed the PE evolutions of the LNG Lane.

The goal of the PE was to develop CT capabilities by exchanging best practices, and demonstrating CT tactics, techniques and procedures among military forces, in support of law enforcement or other designated government agencies.

The Practical Exercise, with a mix of lectures and lane training, showed military support for civilian authorities, promoted building mutual trust through knowledge transfer and exercise activity, and demonstrated Indonesia's leadership. ■







ADMM-Plus PE participants attend lectures and various tactical demonstrations on “best counter-terrorism practices.”



# THE FULL MISSION PROFILE

**T**he Full Mission Profile was an elaborate tactical demonstration by various Counterterrorism units of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) conducted prior to the closing ceremony. In the spirit of multilateral cooperation, the Indonesian hosts graciously welcomed other nations' participants from the Practical Exercise portion to be part of the Full Mission Profile demonstration.

As the TNI may be called upon to deploy in support of the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) and under the operational control of the National Counterterrorism Agency, the Full Mission Profile was a demonstration of tactics the TNI could deploy in support of POLRI.

Indonesian Armed Forces' (TNI) CT units led a Full Mission Profile demonstration, with a sequential takedown of a hijacked mock-up LNG Tanker and a five-story building. Both scenarios included terrorists, with hostages. Originally planned as an Indonesian-only demonstration, Indonesia invited other countries to participate in the less risky portions of the demonstration. ■





# ION


Indonesian special operations forces, with participants from other ADMM-Plus countries, conduct an elaborate counter-terrorism demonstration that included seizure of a hijacked LNG tanker, hostage rescue and disposal of explosive devices.











**THE FULL MISSION PROFILE**



# MEDCAP

## The Medical Civil Action Program

**T**hrough the Medical Civil Action Program (MEDCAP), the Indonesian armed forces provided medical care and prosthesis to scores of poor villagers at the IPSC on the morning prior to the closing ceremony. The Indonesian armed forces — like other militaries in the region — recognize that preventing terrorism may require the military to augment the country's health care system and reduce the threat of disease by collaborating with local medical professionals, interagency partners and local authorities. ■



Recognizing that preventing terrorism is preferred to responding to actual terrorist incidents, militaries often assist civilian authorities and agencies trying to alleviate the root causes of terrorism. (Background) Here, the Indonesian Armed Forces conduct a Medical Civil Action Project or Program, often called a MEDCAP, with villagers living in Sentul. Indonesian Minister of Defense Purnomo Yusgiantoro and DASD William Wechsler appear with Indonesians receiving medical care and prosthetics at the MEDCAP.









Indonesian Minister of Defense Purnomo Yusgiantoro and DASD William F. Wechsler addresses the participants, observers and attending dignitaries at the CTX closing ceremony.

# THE CLOSING CEREMONY

**T**he closing ceremony finalized the first Counter-Terrorism Exercise of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus, capping the event that strived to enhance regional CT capability, increase interoperability and situational awareness, and build trust, understanding and transparency among participants and member states.

The closing ceremony, held at the Indonesian Peace and Security Center, was officiated by the senior co-chair representatives — Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, as well as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, William F. Wechsler.

Minister of Defense Purnomo thanked the Indonesian and other ADMM-Plus country participants for their hard work and willingness to cooperate to enhance regional security against the threat of terrorism.

“We saw counter-terrorism as a new priority when we met in Hanoi in 2010,” Minister of Defense Purnomo said. “This exercise is a warning to the terrorists. If they do something, they will face our special forces, which are united to counter terrorism and transnational crimes.”

DASD Weschler echoed the Minister of Defense’s comments and said that the CTX provided valuable lessons, and focused on building relationships of trust and understanding for future practical cooperation in areas of common security interests. ■






“We saw counter-terrorism as a new priority when we met in Hanoi in 2010. This exercise is a warning to the terrorists. If they do something, they will face our special forces, which are united to counter terrorism and transnational crimes.”

– Minister of Defense Purnomo

Elite Indonesian special operations forces stand at parade rest during the closing ceremony.







## MORE from the CLOSING CEREMONY

Indonesian armed forces parachutists, each carrying a flag of an ADMM-Plus country and the ADMM-Plus CTX flag, land in front of the reviewing stand with dignitaries from the ADMM-Plus countries. ■

(Bottom right) Indonesian special operations forces parachutists present the ADMM-Plus country flags to the various heads of delegations.













# Tree-Planting Ceremony

**R**epresentatives from all ADMM-Plus countries planted a tree to commemorate the lasting partnership of the exercise. A subsequent tree-planting ceremony was conducted by all Heads of Delegation to commemorate the first-ever ADMM-Plus CTX. ■





**LOOKING FORWARD:**

# THE WAY AHEAD





**D**espite only three years in existence, the ADMM-Plus construct has already achieved remarkable progress. The five ADMM-Plus Expert Working Groups (EWG) [soon to number six, with the addition of the EWG for Humanitarian Mine Action] have met numerous times, and have made considerable progress in addressing regional security issues and enhanced responses. In addition to the CTX in Sentul, the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Expert Working Group — along with the Military Medicine Expert Working Group — conducted a major exercise in Brunei from 17 to 20 June 2013. The Maritime Security EWG conducted an exercise at Jervis Bay in Sydney, Australia, from 28 September to 1 October 2013.

However, these discussions and exercises have also revealed issues and areas requiring more research and action on the part of ASEAN, ADMM and ADMM-Plus. Going forward, the EWG-CT will face some challenging issues regarding ASEAN regional security requirements. The CTX in Sentul, along with the exercises and conferences mentioned above, allowed senior ADMM-Plus participants to discuss and identify a number of areas where regional cooperation could and should be improved. In the CTX, the four TTX working groups also offered a series of recommendations that can be summarized under six general categories: Continuity of Effort; Improved Understanding of the Threat Environment; Greater Diversity of Expertise; Enhanced Strategic Communications and Public Affairs; and Emphasis on Education, Training and Exercises. ■







## Findings

- **Continuity of Effort** – Since the co-chairmanship of the EWG-CT lasts for three years, maintaining continuity is a major challenge. Fortunately, the majority of key planners on both sides of the Pacific were able to remain engaged until the conclusion of the exercise. In those instances where key individuals had to be replaced, it did cause disruption and required a steep learning curve for the new individuals assigned to the project.
- **Improved Understanding of the Threat Environment** – The participants appreciated BNPT Director Inspector General (Ret.) Mbai's presentation on the root causes of terrorism, and what strategies and tactics work and don't work when searching for long-term solutions to this complex problem. The All Hazards Risk workshop in Sentul, with its time constraints, prevented the TTX working groups from spending more than an afternoon conducting the All Hazards Risk Assessment. The participants saw the value of the process and realized that to do it properly much more time and expertise were needed.
- **Greater Diversity of Expertise** – Most of the CTX participants were military officers, with a few civilians from various Ministries of Defense. The participants were unanimous in their opinion that since counter-terrorism is a multi-faceted challenge to ADMM-Plus nations, and to the region as a whole, an interagency "whole of government" and multinational effort is required — ideally with a diverse group of experts from, at a minimum, military, law enforcement, foreign affairs and the intelligence services.
- **Enhanced Strategic Communications and Public Affairs** – Terrorism is a crude form of communication. The victims of terrorist attacks are not necessarily the primary audience. Terrorists have skillfully mastered mass media, including social media, to reach audiences of millions throughout the region and around the globe. National governments have been slow to respond to these developments, and the situation becomes even more complex and challenging in circumstances requiring a coordinated regional response. Improved coordination and cooperation in Strategic Communications and Public Affairs activities among ASEAN nations should be stressed. Every TTX working group presentation mentioned the need for better communications at all levels among the countries of the region, and between the countries and the population in the region during a major crisis. Participants believed that too many times these efforts are uneven, imprecise or, in some cases, nonexistent. In a terrorist event, of all times, strategic communications should be robust within ASEAN to work toward its common interest in allaying the fears of its various populations.

There is limited experience and no formal means to develop, coordinate and explore more ASEAN-affiliated Public Affairs workshops, and Strategic Communications seminars and exercises. This may prove inadequate for dynamic situations, such as crises, where there is a need to conduct strategic communications and rapid public affairs messaging for regional and global audiences.

- **Greater Unity of Effort** – While the participants were confident in their nations' ability to handle a national-level threat, they recognized there were few standing mechanisms available for regional coordination and response, especially in a crisis situation. TTX participants believed that the planning and response to prevent or respond to disastrous events in the ASEAN region were fragmented and in need of enhanced cooperation. They saw the need for developing regional response plans that better delineate recommended national responses to consequences management.
- **More Emphasis on Education, Training and Exercises** – The ADMM-Plus effort has identified the need to invest more time and effort on regional education and training to understanding how the military can best contribute to the full spectrum of counter-terrorism efforts, including prevention, de-radicalization and re-integration. The MEDCAP on the final day of the CTX is an example of this non-kinetic contribution. All of these efforts must be validated through realistic exercises.





## Recommendations

The senior TTX and PE participants from all of the ADMM-Plus countries offered a number of superb recommendations on how ASEAN, ADMM and ADMM-Plus could better enhance practical efforts in the prevention and response to terrorism in Southeast Asia. Matching the findings from the CTX, recommendations are briefly stated below.

- **Continuity of Effort** – Identify key individuals who can remain engaged with the planning effort for the duration of the three-year project. In those cases where replacement cannot be avoided, assure a thorough turnover.
- **Improved Understanding of the Threat Environment** – It was recommended that the nations in the region should collectively take a comprehensive and in-depth look at all the hazards facing the region. Conferences, seminars and workshops on the threat of terrorism to the region are needed to improve a common understanding of the threat.
- **Greater Diversity of Expertise** – The EWG-CT should use its leadership position to include experts from nonmilitary areas with counter-terrorism responsibilities, experience and expertise. Military support to civil authorities should encourage pre-crisis cooperation with individuals from various nonmilitary agencies, such as law enforcement, intelligence services, government social and disaster response agencies, and ministries of foreign affairs.
- **Enhanced Strategic Communications and Public Affairs** – Develop mechanisms to craft and implement regional communication strategies and messages, including in crisis situations. The TTX working groups recommended more regional workshops on Strategic Communications and Public Affairs, with the establishment of multilateral working committees on the topic.
- **Greater Unity of Effort** – The senior participants stated there were many opportunities for those Expert Working Groups, with overlapping responsibilities, to better coordinate and cooperate. For example, the TTX participants believed that the maritime terrorism scenario required the Maritime Security and Counter-Terrorism Expert Working Groups to work closely together. In the case of a response to WMD terrorism, there is also an opportunity for the Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief and Military Medicine EWGs to provide considerable expertise.

It was also recommended that the EWG-CT explore the adoption of the Incident Command System, as used by many United Nations' member states for pre-event, event and possible consequence management efforts in support of major regional events. A common modular management construct agreed to by involved nations could streamline response and improve coordination in a crisis.

- **Increase Emphasis on Education, Training and Exercises** – All of the participants appreciated the opportunity to meet with their ADMM-Plus colleagues in Sentul to discuss regional responses to terrorism, as well as the presentations at the periodic meetings of the ADMM-Plus EWG for CT. More emphasis is needed on the questions of what role de-radicalization and re-integration should take in ADMM-Plus' counter-terrorism efforts. ADMM-Plus should grapple with how best to incorporate not only kinetic tactics, but also non-kinetic solutions into its counter-terrorism strategies. The EWG-CT should also address the challenge of how to measure effectiveness in a variety of counter-terrorism efforts.

It was also recommended that exercises at the strategic, operational and tactical levels be designed, scheduled and conducted. A variety of multinational Command Post Exercises (CPXs), Table Top Exercises (TTXs), Practical Exercises (PEs) and Field Training Exercises (FTXs) are needed to close the seams between countries working together to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks.

All of the participants recognized that no single country alone has the solution to these and other future challenges. However, the 18 ADMM-Plus countries are confident that under the leadership of the incoming co-chairs, Singapore and Australia, the EWG-CT effort will continue to work toward multilateral efforts to seek and implement solutions under the ADMM-Plus construct. ■



Singapore and Australia will assume co-chairmanship for the EWG-CT in April 2014. The Singaporean Representative is Brigadier General Chia Choon Hong, Director of Joint Operations, and the Australian Representative is Brigadier General Dan McDaniel, Special Operations Commander.

**F**ollowing the closing ceremony, Minister of Defense Purnomo Yusgiantoto and his Director for Defense Strategy General Sonny Prasetyo, along with U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William Wechsler presented a statue of a soldier as a symbolic gesture of the passing of the co-chairmanship from the current co-chairs, Indonesia and the United States, to the incoming co-chairs, Singapore and Australia.





The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) conducts intensive, high-quality education and training in civil-military relations for U.S. and international military officers and civilian officials, both in the host country and at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

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The Center's unique capacity-building programs utilize cutting-

edge theoretical and applied expertise. Its programs address democratic defense management norms throughout the world in order to improve legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficiency of defense and security institutions. The degree of engagement varies for each region, country or partner.

CCMR also conducts seminars and workshops in support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). The program takes a holistic approach to investigating the most effective government responses to terrorism. CTFP provides both in-residence programs in Monterey, California, and mobile education teams to countries and regions throughout the world.

